從英國T Levels看職業教育的制度困局 《信報》

從英國T Levels看職業教育的制度困局 《信報》

每年初夏，無數學子均為爭奪大學學位而迎戰公開試。然而，學位並非就業保證，有論者指，社會應優化職業教育，為非學術專長的年輕人提供升學以外的出路，可是職業教育在各國推行多年，成功例子卻仍寥寥可數。為何各國不斷努力之下，職業教育仍難以建立公信力、取信於社會？

職業教育的困境並非香港獨有。自2020年起，英國投放超過五億英鎊，在高中推行職業導向的T Levels課程，為學生提供商業行政、工程與製造、創意媒體與設計等職業導向科目，並加入45天（合共315小時）的實習環節，以取代認受性備受質疑的舊BTEC（Business and Technology Education Council）證書。然而，教育智庫Edge Foundation的跟進研究訪問了首五年參與課程的企業與師生，揭示其深層問題不止於課程與評鑑設計，更在於企業沒有誘因積極參與（註）。

校企協作方面，研究顯示部分醫護或建築公司基於安全考慮與法規要求，未必願意提供實習機會，或只容許學生從旁觀察，以免承擔責任；其次，能提供較多實習職位的，往往是已發展成熟的傳統產業，如製造業、商務會計等，新興行業本身立足未穩，未必有餘力提供實習機會。換言之，學生未必能透過職業教育真正迎接「未來職場」。

課程與評鑑方面，研究指出從事職業教育的教師既可來自傳統A-level學校體系，亦可來自舊BTEC或業界前線。前者重理論，後者重實務，理念與評鑑標準難以統一。因此，學生即使修讀同一科目，學習經歷也截然不同，甚至有超過一半受訪學生坦言，所學內容無助其融入目標行業。

教師方面，研究指出受訪教師行政壓力大增。因為除了教學以外，他們還需要承擔聯繫企業、簽訂合約、學生配對等額外行政工作。

相對認受性不足、定位模糊的BTEC和T-level，一海之隔的德國職業教育之所以相對成功，主因在於執行者並非學校，而是由不同行業中，擁有獨立發牌制度的公會或商會主導師資培訓、課程設計、評鑑及監督，而這正正是英國與香港職業教育所欠缺，卻較少被提及的關鍵一環。況且，德國職業教育同樣存在問題——優質實習機會向中產學生嚴重傾斜，弱勢學生的就業前景仍無法保障。不幸的是，實習生是由企業自行篩選，而這更多取決於申請者家庭背景，弱勢學生難以靠個人努力彌補。

總括而言，為學生開拓學術以外的新賽道，固然值得肯定，但職業教育並非純粹教育問題，更不能脫離產業結構而存在。擁有航天工業、晶片、基因工程等多元產業的英國尚且如此，長期由金融服務業一元獨大的香港，能提供多少「多元」實習機會，避免學生進入低技術人才供應鏈？再者，即使香港成功克服上述種種困難，又是否準備好迎接下一波「實習機會分配不均」的階級複製問題？這些都值得社會進一步深思。

註︰Edge Foundation (2024). Skills shortages in the UK economy. https://www.edge.co.uk/documents/480/DD1279_-_Skills_shortages_bulletin_summary_2024_FINAL.pdf

梁亦華(2026.05.26)︰從英國T Levels看職業教育的制度困局，《信報教育》。https://edu.hkej.com/php/article.detail.php?aid=64229

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人口下降與殺校潮︰質素與資源的社會抉擇 《信報》/ Population Decline and the Wave of School Closures: A Social Choice Between Quality and Resources

人口下降與殺校潮︰質素與資源的社會抉擇 《信報》

隨着近年香港出生人口下降，小學收生不足的情況日趨嚴重，下學年更有15所小學收生不足，獲派「零班」。有建議提出容許學校招收非本地生，以彌補本地生源不足，但亦有論者指出非本地生入讀公帑資助的學校並不合適。過去二十多年，學界曾如何回應殺校潮，現今為何有所不同？

過去學生人數下降並不一定被視為問題，反而是推行教改和優化教育的機會。例如，收生不足的學校獲容許進入直資計劃，除了使更多學校透過家長擇校的市場化機制，優化教育質素，亦增加學校課程彈性自主，推動多元教育，如IB課程、高中多元選修；此外，學校亦被鼓勵推行小班教學，降低師生比例，增加師生互動，令教師更能照顧學生個別差異。

那麼，上述政策的操作空間仍存在嗎？儘管直資學校數目有所擴展，77%小學仍是以公營（官立或資助）學校為主，仍難稱為多元教育體系；自2024年起，香港小學班級正式以25名學生一班為標準班額，但比起美國（20）、德國（21）、法國（21）等（註），仍有優化空間。

事實上，社會議論的轉向，更多是教育質素以外的原因。首先，如不少論者所言，市場化的核心之一，是以市場之力汰弱留強，弱校要建立自己的明確特色，並說服家長相信，並不容易；其次，小班教學同時導致名校的班級名額及叩門位減少，這亦會引起部分家長不滿；最後，而且是最重要的，是資源問題。支持優質教育的前提在於資源充裕，可是在目前赤字高企、削減公共開支的要求下，維持教育開支相對醫療、社會福利及保安等範疇而言，更難得到社會支持。畢竟後三者關係所有市民的貼身福祉，教育質素則只跟有子女的家長，以及社會長遠發展有關。

從上可見，人口下降不必然導致上述問題，重點是社會整體選擇。我們到底希望培養有質素、對香港有歸屬感的下一代？還是着眼維持福利和解決經濟問題？兩者均有利弊，更無絕對對錯。因此，這問題最核心的關鍵，其實在於香港希望由誰承擔，以及何時付出這些不可避免的代價。

OECD (2025). Education at a Glance 2025: OECD Indicators. Paris: OECD Publishing.

梁亦華(2026.05.22)︰人口下降與殺校潮︰質素與資源的社會抉擇，《信報教育》。

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Population Decline and the Wave of School Closures: A Social Choice Between Quality and Resources

Hong Kong Economic Journal

With Hong Kong’s birth rate falling in recent years, under-enrolment in primary schools has become increasingly acute. In the coming academic year alone, 15 primary schools have been allocated “zero classes” after failing to recruit enough students. Some have proposed allowing schools to admit non-local students to offset the shrinking local student population, while others argue that it is inappropriate for non-local children to enter publicly funded schools. Yet more than twenty years ago, the education sector responded rather differently to earlier waves of school closures. Why has the atmosphere changed?

In the past, a decline in student numbers was not necessarily treated as a crisis. It was often regarded as an opportunity to advance education reform and improve teaching quality. Schools facing under-enrolment were allowed to join the Direct Subsidy Scheme, enabling more schools to operate through a market-oriented mechanism of parental choice. The intention was not merely to encourage competition, but also to expand curricular autonomy and promote educational diversity, including IB programmes and a broader range of senior secondary electives. Schools were also encouraged to adopt small-class teaching, reducing teacher-student ratios and increasing classroom interaction so that teachers could respond more effectively to individual learning differences.

The question now is whether such policy space still exists. Although the number of Direct Subsidy Scheme schools has grown, 77 per cent of primary schools remain within the public sector, whether government or aided schools, making it difficult to describe Hong Kong as a genuinely diverse education system. Since 2024, the official standard class size for primary schools has been set at 25 students per class. Even so, there remains room for further improvement when compared with countries such as the United States (20), Germany (21), and France (21).

In truth, the shift in public discussion has less to do with educational quality than with pressures outside education itself. As many commentators have pointed out, one of the central assumptions of marketisation is that weaker schools will eventually be eliminated through competition. For struggling schools, however, establishing a distinctive identity and persuading parents of its value is far from easy. Small-class teaching has also reduced the number of places available in elite schools, including discretionary admission places, which inevitably provokes dissatisfaction among some parents.

Above all, the issue is one of resources. High-quality education depends on sustained public investment. Yet under the current fiscal deficit and mounting calls to reduce public expenditure, education spending finds it increasingly difficult to command support when placed alongside healthcare, social welfare, and public security. The latter three concern the immediate wellbeing of the entire population, whereas educational quality appears, at least in the short term, to concern only parents with children and the longer-term development of society.

What this reveals is that population decline does not inevitably produce these outcomes. Much depends on the choices society is prepared to make. Does Hong Kong still wish to cultivate a younger generation with quality education and a sense of belonging to the city? Or is the priority now the preservation of welfare provision and the resolution of economic pressures? Neither path is without cost, and neither carries absolute moral authority. The deeper question is who Hong Kong expects to bear these unavoidable costs, and when society is willing to pay them.

OECD (2025). Education at a Glance 2025: OECD Indicators. Paris: OECD Publishing.

Leung, Y. W. (2026.05.22). Population Decline and the Wave of School Closures: A Social Choice Between Quality and Resources, Hong Kong Economic Journal.

「水龍頭」關上後 誰在沉沒——論暑假與學力流失《信報教育》 / When the Faucet Is Turned Off, Who Sinks? - Summer Holidays and Learning Loss

「水龍頭」關上後 誰在沉沒——論暑假與學力流失 《信報教育》

過去十數年，學童自殺、學生功課壓力、精神狀態，乃至書包過重等新聞，經常成為社會焦點。少勞多得的Flip Classroom（翻轉教室）、一人一機的電子學習等，亦相繼成為一時潮流，而內地自2021年「雙減」政策實施以來，功課量被全面限制，如小三至小六書面作業時間不多於60分鐘，初中不多於90分鐘等。不同改革均指向同一目標︰學校角色應予弱化。對學生而言，學校角色最弱的時間，非暑假莫屬。然而，學校淡出後，學生是否真的能盡情享受愉快假期？背後有何隱藏成本？

在西方國家，長假或功課過少對學生的危害已吸引不少學者注意。其中，美國學者Entwisle等提出「水龍頭理論」（Faucet Theory），其研究指出暑假前後學生各學科的能力均倒退一至兩個月不等，並稱之為「夏季失落」（summer loss）。學生倒退程度與家長社經地位（Social economic status, SES）呈負相關，即社經地位愈低，成績倒退愈多。Quinn等學者的後續研究則進一步顯示，數學科能力的倒退最為明顯，閱讀次之。這些學力流失均直接影響社經地位較低的學生的高中完成率及大學升學機會。

近年內地針對各省市盲目減負的評論，亦有相似反思，指出減負迫令學校縮減課時，甚至限制教師給予家課，令基層與中產學生的差異愈來愈大。背後原因就是因為減負增加了課餘時間，令中產家庭的資源優勢突顯出來。中產家庭因應更多空間，投放額外資源於孩子學術訓練或體藝發展之上；基層學生則無拘無束，歲月靜好，直至升學瓶頸出現。

坊間有云︰「世上最恐怖的，就是比你優秀的人比你還努力。」不論學生減負政策，還是因疫情原因長期停課，一旦學校的影響力被壓抑，學生社經地位的優勢便會加倍放大，造成更大的學習差異。在長假後復課的班級中，教師該如何應付這挑戰？趕鴨子上架的學生能否適應新學年的課業？

與此同時，社會各界也應該深刻反思，到底減低學校干預，減少家課負擔，會否影響教育均等？訓練所有孩子自律，是理想；寄望所有孩子自律，卻是否有點妄想？學界不斷追捧一些假設所有孩子自律，完成課前自主學習的教學設計，再「一刀切」地向外推廣，這對下一代會造成什麼影響？每年長假後的學力流失，早已是教育界人所共知的事實，但社會有否發現它對上述問題的啟示？

梁亦華 (2025.08.11). 「水龍頭」關上後 誰在沉沒——論暑假與學力流失，《信報教育》，C04。

When the Faucet Is Turned Off, Who Sinks? — On Summer Holidays and Learning Loss
《Hong Kong Economic Journal》

Over the past decade, public concern has repeatedly turned to student suicide, homework pressure, mental well-being, and even the burden of heavy schoolbags. Alongside this, educational innovations such as the “flipped classroom” and one-device-per-student e-learning have come and gone as policy and pedagogical trends. In mainland China, the introduction of the “Double Reduction” policy in 2021 marked a more explicit attempt to curb academic load, including caps on written homework—no more than 60 minutes for primary upper grades and 90 minutes for junior secondary students. Although these reforms look quite different on the surface, they seem to be moving in a similar direction—gradually reducing the role schools play in students’ everyday learning. And if there is any period when that role is most diminished, it is the summer holiday. The question is what happens when schools step back: do students simply enjoy a more liberated break, or are there costs that remain largely unexamined?

In Western research, the consequences of extended breaks or reduced academic input have long been documented. The “Faucet Theory” proposed by Entwisle and colleagues offers a useful metaphor: academic support flows during term time but is partially turned off during summer. Their findings suggest that students typically lose one to two months of learning across subjects over the summer period, a pattern labelled “summer loss.” Crucially, this decline is not evenly distributed. It is strongly correlated with socioeconomic status (SES): the lower the family background, the greater the learning regression. Subsequent work by Quinn and others further shows that the most pronounced decline occurs in mathematics, followed by reading. Over time, these small learning losses can add up, putting students from less advantaged backgrounds at a real disadvantage—especially when it comes to finishing high school or getting into university.

A similar line of reflection has emerged in recent commentary on “burden reduction” policies across mainland China. Critics have pointed out that reducing instructional time and restricting homework may unintentionally widen the gap between working-class and middle-class students. It’s not hard to see what’s going on here. When school becomes less structured, students simply have more free time—and how that time is used often depends on what their families can provide. Middle-class families are more likely to convert this time into structured enrichment—academic tutoring, music, sports, or other forms of cultivation. By contrast, students from less advantaged backgrounds are more likely to spend this time without systematic guidance, only to encounter sharper educational pressure at later transition points.

There is a popular saying that the most unsettling situation is when those already ahead continue to work harder. Whether through policy-driven “deburdening” or prolonged school closures during the pandemic, once the influence of formal schooling is weakened, socioeconomic advantages tend to become more visible and more consequential. Learning gaps widen not gradually but cumulatively, often becoming most apparent when students return to school after long breaks. Teachers are then left managing classrooms with sharply uneven readiness, while students are abruptly required to readjust to academic routines they have partially drifted away from. Whether these transitions can actually be handled smoothly is still a question schools continue to struggle with.

At a deeper level, this raises a more uncomfortable question about the relationship between schooling, autonomy, and equality. Reducing school intervention and homework load is often framed as a step towards healthier, more self-directed learning. But is it realistic to assume that all children possess equal capacity for self-regulation? Training children to be self-disciplined is an educational ideal; assuming it as a universal starting point may be closer to wishful thinking. Yet contemporary pedagogical design increasingly builds on precisely this assumption, scaling up models of autonomous pre-class learning and applying them broadly across diverse student populations. This raises an important question: what happens when we expect all students to learn in the same way? It’s something that probably needs a closer look.

Learning loss after long holidays is hardly a new discovery in education research. The more pressing issue is whether its implications are being properly absorbed: not only in terms of academic performance, but also in how policy choices may inadvertently reshape inequality itself?

Leung, Y. W. (2025.08.11). When the Faucet Is Turned Off, Who Sinks? — On Summer Holidays and Learning Loss, Hong Kong Economic Journal, C04.

高學歷媽媽忽視運動？《明報》/ Do Highly Educated Mothers Overlook the Importance of Exercise?

高學歷媽媽忽視運動？《明報》 

【明報專訊】古語有云︰「勤有功，戲無益」。在中國人傳統教育下的家長，很多時會認為遊戲與運動是不務正業，影響孩子的學業成績。近年愈來愈多研究指出運動對兒童發展有種種好處，但家長對體能活動的看法又有否改變？他們的看法又如何影響教養行為？

為了解家長對體能活動的看法與教養活動的關係，本研究團隊訪問了201個幼稚園家長，了解他們的體能屬性（physical activity attribute），包括對運動重要度的認知、親子運動的享受程度、鼓勵孩子運動的信心，從而審視不同性別、年齡及學歷的家長對體能活動的認知差異，以及他們的認知如何影響教養行為。 

受「把學習成績與運動對立」思維影響

研究結果顯示，家長對兒童體能的重視程度會直接影響他們的日常教養行為。例如，家長愈明白運動的重要，對子女參與體能活動會給予愈多情感支援和自主選擇，亦會安排更多有組織或親子形式的體能活動。此外，他們會較少追求子女在運動上的成就，或以禁止運動作為懲罰。

研究又發現學歷高的母親，傾向輕視保持孩子活躍的重要，較少享受親子運動，亦較少建立孩子在運動方面的信心。這可能源於上一代「男動女靜」的社會期望，以及女生較受傳統「把學習成績與運動對立」的思維影響，致使高學歷的女性更傾向忽視運動的重要，並影響下一代幼兒的體能發展。這類母親傾向採用保守和被動的教養方法，如較少主動組織家庭體能活動。在新冠疫情及流感肆虐的環境下，孩子就更難保持良好的體能發展。另一方面，她們對指導孩子的體能活動欠缺信心及情感支援，會令孩子更難投入或維持有系統的體能活動。

協助家長將運動融入生活

要改變家長對運動的看法，可以從社區教育層面着手，讓更多家長認識體能發展對孩子的健康、學業、心理發展的重要。康文署也可與各校家長教師會聯合舉辦工作坊，協助家長因應孩子的興趣和才能，有系統地組織體能活動。對於較少做運動的家長，他們對運動的信心可能較弱，未必知道如何鼓勵孩子做運動的信心。事實上，政府和不少機構都有提供資訊，協助家長將運動融入家庭生活，如本校幼兒教育學系便設有HKidsMove項目，家長可以在官方網頁（www.hkidsmove.info）、facebook專頁和YouTube頻道，獲取不同體能發展活動的信息，學習如何在家做親子瑜伽和體能遊戲，讓全家人一同以運動放鬆心情並感受休閒的樂趣。

文：Dr. Catherine M. Capio（香港教育大學幼兒教育學系助理教授）、梁亦華（香港教育大學教育及人類發展學院博士後研究員）

Capio, C. M., & Leung, Y. W. (2023.02.21). Do Highly Educated Mothers Overlook the Importance of Exercise? MingPao. https://ol.mingpao.com/ldy/family/parentchild/20230221/1676916872536

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Do Highly Educated Mothers Overlook the Importance of Exercise? (MingPao)

An old Chinese saying runs: “Diligence brings reward; play is useless.” Among many parents shaped by traditional Chinese education, games and sport are still treated as distractions from academic success rather than part of a child’s growth. Research in recent years has steadily dismantled that assumption, linking physical activity to a wide range of developmental benefits. Yet whether parental attitudes have shifted remains an open question, as does the way those attitudes shape everyday parenting.

To explore the relationship between parents’ views on physical activity and their parenting practices, our research team surveyed 201 kindergarten parents. The study examined their “physical activity attributes”: how strongly they valued exercise, how much they enjoyed parent-child physical activities, and how confident they felt encouraging their children to be active. We then analysed how perceptions differed across gender, age and educational background, and how those perceptions filtered into parenting behaviour.

The findings point to a direct relationship between parents’ attitudes towards physical activity and the routines they establish at home. Parents who recognised the importance of exercise were more likely to provide emotional support for their children’s participation, allow greater autonomy in choosing activities, and organise more structured or family-based physical activities. They were also less inclined to prioritise sporting achievement or use restrictions on exercise as punishment.

One finding stood out. Mothers with higher levels of education tended to place less importance on keeping children physically active, derived less enjoyment from parent-child exercise, and were less likely to build their children’s confidence in sport and movement. Part of this may reflect older social expectations that men should be active while women remain restrained, alongside a deeply rooted tendency to frame academic achievement and sport as opposing pursuits. Women who advanced through highly competitive education systems may therefore be more likely to internalise the idea that exercise is secondary to study, carrying those assumptions into the next generation and affecting young children’s physical development in turn.

Such mothers were also more likely to adopt cautious and passive parenting approaches, showing less initiative in organising family physical activities. In an environment shaped by recurring outbreaks of Covid-19 and seasonal influenza, children face even greater difficulty maintaining healthy physical development. A lack of parental confidence in guiding physical activity, coupled with limited emotional support, can further weaken a child’s willingness to engage in sustained and structured exercise.

Changing parental attitudes towards sport requires more than isolated health campaigns. Community education has a role to play in helping parents understand how physical development underpins not only children’s health, but also their academic and psychological well-being. The Leisure and Cultural Services Department could work with school parent-teacher associations to organise workshops that help families structure physical activities around children’s interests and abilities.

Parents who exercise less themselves often lack confidence in encouraging their children to be active, and may simply not know where to begin. Yet resources already exist. Government departments and non-profit organisations have produced a range of materials designed to help families incorporate exercise into daily life. The HKidsMove project run by our Department of Early Childhood Education, for example, provides information through its official website, Facebook page and YouTube channel, offering guidance on parent-child yoga, home-based movement games and other activities that allow families to relax together through exercise while rediscovering the pleasures of leisure.

設「社會保險」保障送餐員權益 企業與消費者共擔責 - 《明報》/ Shared Responsibility for Delivery Riders’ Rights Through Social Insurance

肺炎疫情肆虐一年，持續限聚令百業蕭條，但送餐中介業務卻如雨後春筍。短短數年間，內地最大食品外送平台美團，市值已發展至約1.7萬億港元，香港foodpanda、Deliveroo、 Uber Eats等不同送餐平台，亦提供了近5萬個就業職位，一季營收可達80 億港元。然而，作為逆市下最蓬勃發展的行業之一，與送餐員相關的交通事故亦急速上升。

如何避免「以命送餐」？

2020年首11個月，香港涉及單車及電單車的交通意外較2019年同期增加三成至5369宗，多位送餐員受傷，甚至命危。然而相關外送平台往往毋須負責，僅透過小量保險作有限援助，甚或「出於人道主義」，僅發放數千慰問金了事。到底為什麼送餐員成為高風險行業？欠缺工會的送餐員群體，安全又該如何獲得保障，避免「以命送餐」的悲劇不斷出現？

過去社會對外賣平台的批判，多集中於它有否以「自僱」之名，把企業責任一併外判，又或它有否剝削員工，過度壓縮送餐時間，致使靠多勞多得取酬的送餐員，被迫「以身犯險」，把駕駛速度推至極限。外賣平台的企業責任自不待言，然而，眾多評論者卻少有關注企業以外，作為外送經濟受益者的送餐員與政府，有何角色與責任。

對基層而言 自僱身分實是雙面刃

雖然近來僧多粥少的競爭，令送餐員收入持續下降，但送餐員這幾近沒有門檻、時間有彈性的工作，仍然是不少失業者的救命稻草。對基層而言，自僱身分實是雙面刃，它之所以容許低入行門檻，正正源於企業聘用員工時不受體能與保險的掣肘，也沒有福利過多、尾大不掉的顧忌。

對政府而言，民間自僱服務日趨盛行，既解決了失業率高企，引發社會動盪的隱患，政府亦能從企業盈利中獲得豐厚稅收，一舉兩得，故一般樂見其成。宏觀來說，外賣平台正正是高度市場化下，企業彈性聘用、員工彈性流動的典型例子。外送平台的興起，為社會帶來自由與機遇，但也誘使企業以剝削員工保障來追逐利益最大化。基層雖能解一時困境，長遠而言，他們失去了連續的生涯敘述，自僱制度亦侵蝕了傳統以來重視員工對企業的信賴、忠誠及互相付託的人文精神。

社會保險促使企業與送餐員團結

正如亞里士多德所言：「善常存兩惡之間，一種惡為過度，一種惡為欠缺。」政府無所作為，令基層毫無議價能力和福利保障，固然不當；政府過度管制，令企業「少做少錯」，扼殺基層僅有的謀生空間，亦非上策。針對外賣員欠缺保障的問題，政府實可考慮鼓勵設立社會保險（Social insurance），讓不同持份者共同分擔風險。現時送餐員均以個人身分提供服務，彼此沒有工會連結，亦沒有相互幫助的義務。對此，社會保險能促使企業與各送餐員團結一致，讓健全者支援不幸傷亡者，企業亦能間接扶助前線員工，彼此在無形中相互依存，共同承擔整個行業的風險與命運。

在香港，社會保險並非新事物，但較少用於員工保障之上。常見如保障消費者的旅遊業印花稅制度、分擔循環再造成本的生產者責任計劃（電子廢物徵費）、從源頭防止濫用的塑膠購物袋收費計劃等政策措施，民間則有倡議公平貿易的咖啡產品。消費者均願額外付費或承擔溢價，以達至環保、扶貧或分攤共同風險等不同目的，從而與弱勢社群、其他消費者，乃至地球整體構成命運共同體。

世界各國亦開始透過社會保險，為送餐員提供不同程度的保障，但此責任更多被歸於外送平台。例如，日本Uber Eats 外送員勞動組合便積極爭取，成功讓外送平台Uber Eats建立「傷害補償制度」，意外受傷或身亡的送餐員能分別獲最多25 萬日圓（約1.85 萬港元）及1000 萬日圓（約74 萬港元）的慰問金；法國的巴黎獨立送餐員團體（Collectif des Livreurs Autonomes Parisiens，CLAP）則發動連串遊行，逼令Deliveroo為送餐員提供免費醫療保險，報銷基本報銷額200%醫療費和住院費。國內沒有類似的送餐員工會，政府規定相關車輛購買交通意外保險，而送餐員自身安全，則靠外賣平台自律購買的人身意外保險提供保障。

良心消費 各方共贏

世上沒有免費午餐，關鍵問題是：「誰付鈔？」（someone has to pay）。要為送餐員安全提供合理保障，外送平台及消費者便需要共同承擔。縱使，社會保險會為外送經濟帶來額外成本，但企業能以此洗脫「剝削員工，強迫以命送餐」的惡名，實踐實惠的社會責任，消費者亦需要明白，方便的服務，需要為提供服務的人士的安全有所貢獻，作良心消費，真真正正做到共創（co-creation）、共享（co-sharing）的各方共贏局面。

梁亦華、陳之翰、葉兆輝 (2021.02.04)︰〈設「社會保險」保障送餐員權益 企業與消費者共擔責〉，《明報》，B09 觀點。

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Shared Responsibility for Delivery Riders’ Rights Through Social Insurance

A year of pandemic restrictions devastated large parts of the economy, yet food delivery platforms expanded at extraordinary speed. In only a few years, Meituan, mainland China’s largest food delivery platform, grew into a company valued at roughly HK$1.7 trillion. In Hong Kong, platforms such as foodpanda, Deliveroo and Uber Eats together created close to 50,000 jobs, with quarterly revenues reaching HK$8 billion. Yet alongside the rapid expansion of one of the few booming sectors during the downturn came a sharp rise in traffic accidents involving delivery riders.

How, then, can society prevent riders from “delivering meals with their lives at stake”?

During the first eleven months of 2020, traffic accidents in Hong Kong involving bicycles and motorcycles rose by 30 per cent year-on-year to 5,369 cases. Many delivery riders were injured; some suffered life-threatening accidents. The platforms themselves, however, rarely bore substantial responsibility. Most provided only limited insurance coverage or token compensation, sometimes framed merely as gestures “on humanitarian grounds”. The deeper question is why delivery work has become such a high-risk occupation, and how a workforce with little union representation can secure meaningful protection before more tragedies occur.

Public criticism of food delivery platforms has largely focused on whether companies evade employer responsibilities by classifying riders as self-employed contractors, or whether the relentless compression of delivery times effectively forces riders — paid according to the number of orders completed — to push themselves to dangerous limits on the road. The corporate responsibilities of delivery platforms are undeniable. Yet far less attention has been paid to the roles and responsibilities of others who benefit from the delivery economy, including riders themselves, consumers and government.

For many working-class people, self-employment is both opportunity and trap. Competition among riders has intensified in recent years, steadily eroding incomes. Even so, delivery work — with its low barriers to entry and flexible hours — remains a lifeline for many unemployed workers. The very flexibility that makes such work accessible also stems from the absence of conventional employment protections. Platforms can recruit without the obligations attached to physical assessments, insurance liabilities or long-term staff welfare.

Governments, too, often view the expansion of self-employed services favourably. The growth of gig work absorbs unemployment pressures that might otherwise fuel wider social instability, while profitable platforms generate substantial tax revenues. Seen from a broader perspective, food delivery platforms embody the logic of highly marketised economies: flexible hiring for companies, flexible labour mobility for workers. The sector undoubtedly creates opportunity and convenience. Yet it also encourages firms to maximise profits by weakening labour protections. Workers may escape immediate hardship, but over time they lose any stable sense of career continuity, while the self-employed model steadily erodes older ideas of loyalty, trust and mutual obligation between employer and employee.

As Aristotle observed, virtue lies between excess and deficiency. A government that does nothing leaves vulnerable workers without bargaining power or welfare protection. Yet excessive regulation may lead companies to retreat into caution, shrinking one of the few remaining sources of income for the working poor. Neither extreme offers a workable solution.

A more balanced approach would be for the government to encourage the creation of social insurance schemes through which risk is collectively shared among stakeholders. At present, delivery riders operate as isolated individuals. They lack union ties and bear no formal obligations toward one another. Social insurance could create a structure that binds platforms and riders into a more interdependent community, allowing healthier workers to support those injured or killed on the job, while enabling companies to contribute indirectly to the welfare of frontline staff. Risk and responsibility would no longer fall solely on individuals, but be distributed across the industry as a whole.

Social insurance is hardly unfamiliar in Hong Kong, though it has seldom been applied directly to labour protection. Existing examples include the travel industry levy that protects consumers, producer responsibility schemes such as electronic waste charges, and the plastic shopping bag levy designed to curb environmental waste at source. Fair trade coffee initiatives in the private sector operate on similar principles. In each case, consumers accept additional costs in pursuit of broader social aims — environmental protection, poverty reduction or collective risk-sharing — recognising a degree of shared responsibility with vulnerable groups, other consumers and society at large.

Other countries have already begun extending forms of social insurance to delivery riders, though responsibility often remains centred on the platforms themselves. In Japan, the Uber Eats Union successfully pressured Uber Eats into establishing an injury compensation scheme, under which injured riders may receive condolence payments of up to ¥250,000, while families of deceased riders may receive up to ¥10 million. In France, the Paris-based riders’ collective Collectif des Livreurs Autonomes Parisiens organised protests that compelled Deliveroo to provide free medical insurance covering hospitalisation and extended healthcare costs. Hong Kong lacks comparable rider unions. Current policy merely requires relevant vehicles to carry traffic accident insurance, while riders’ personal safety depends largely on whether platforms voluntarily purchase accident coverage.

There is no such thing as a free lunch. The central question is simple: who pays?

If delivery riders are to receive meaningful protection, both platforms and consumers must share the cost. Social insurance would undoubtedly increase operating expenses within the delivery economy. Yet platforms could shed the reputation of profiting from workers forced to “risk their lives for deliveries”, while demonstrating a more credible form of corporate responsibility. Consumers, meanwhile, must recognise that convenience carries obligations. If society wishes to enjoy fast and inexpensive delivery services, it must also contribute to the safety and dignity of those who provide them. Only then can the rhetoric of co-creation and shared benefit become something more than a marketing slogan.  

Leung, Y. W., Chan, C. H., & Yip, S. F. (2021.02.04). Shared Responsibility for Delivery Riders’ Rights Through Social Insurance, Mingpao, B09.

從教師自殺看辦學團體監管責任 - 《信報財經新聞》/ A Teacher’s Suicide and the Accountability of School Sponsoring Bodies

教師自殺並非新鮮事，日前某小學的教師自殺事件卻引起預期外的激烈反響。根據 過往經驗，學校一般只會循例對死者讚揚兩句「熱心教學，未覺精神有異，殊感可 惜」；家長則關心孩子有否受影響，甚至怪罪死者為何選在學校自殺，嚇壞孩子等 等，今次卻因同校其他教師群起向媒體申訴，才令事件得到關注。自殺悲劇的原因 錯綜複雜，但觀乎各方資料顯示，不難發現辦學團體與屬下學校的管理問題。

首先曝光的是投訴機制名存實亡。同校教師指出，辦學團體此前兩次接到針對校長 的匿名投訴後，只要求後者作書面解釋，其後如何處理，乃至有否處理，均不了了 之；今次接到林老師的具名投訴後，竟反向校長查證她在校內情況，直接引起今次 悲劇。

 這顯示一般管理層處理投訴的弔詭之處：對匿名投訴，管理方能以「保護私隱」為 由官官相衞，或以「無法查證投訴事項」直接拒絕受理；對於具名投訴，則處理提 出問題者，當作處理問題，把投訴（者）交回校長自行解決。如此不顧前線死活的 冷血官僚思維，無疑令人心寒。

校本管理衍生問題

當問題愈揭愈多，辦學團體則開始回應「校長已休假，入住沙田醫院精神科」及已 設立「獨立調查委員會」，一句「調查未有結論前，不作評論」便能金蟬脫殼。這 公關技巧純熟不已，這只是為了拖延至傳媒失去興趣，淡化事件而已。當局是否真 的有心檢討機制？實是疑問。

其次，事件發生之前，乃至林老師自殺之後，校監和眾多校董到底做了些什麼？正 如校政專家雷其昌日前所言，「人的問題」才是癥結所在。為何負責遴選校長的校 董和校監，會選出一位品格有爭議，乃至可能患有精神病的人擔此領導重任？

過去數年，他們有否詢問任何一位離職教師出走原因，以了解教員離職率為何一直 高企？筆者不反對精神病患者擔當校長要職，但辦學團體是否有責任向教職員、學 生及眾多家長交代他們這聘用決定，以及說服師生繼續大愛包容，支持該校長帶着 月薪 10 萬「抱病」休養？

多年以來，「一切為了學生，為了學生一切」的教改口號響徹雲霄，校本管理也成 為拆牆鬆綁的象徵，但從今次事件可見，校本管理同時衍生出官僚卸責、專制弄權 等問題，卻從沒有受各方重視。一如作家 Eldridge Cleaver 所言︰「如你不是答案的一 部分，便是問題的一部分」。筆者心底還是衷心希望，辦學團體東華三院的反思和 檢討，會是「答案」的一部分。

梁亦華(2019.03.29)︰從教師自殺看辦學團體監管責任，《信報財經新聞》，C04，教育講論。 
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English Summary

-          In an article contributed to HKEJ, Mr Leung said the school sponsoring body's ineffective complaint handling system is the major culprit causing a teacher to commit suicide.

-          The school sponsoring body could decline to process complaints lodged anonymously, citing lack of evidence or privacy reasons, while cases lodged with complainants' names provided will be handled by the principals, who may be the very persons they complained about.

-          Mr Leung also said the school sponsoring body has not even looked into the reasons behind teachers' resignation; while the school-based management has been used by government officials as an excuse to shrug off responsibilities.

A Teacher’s Suicide and the Accountability of School Sponsoring Bodies

Teacher suicides are tragically not uncommon. Yet the recent death of a primary school teacher provoked a level of public outrage few had anticipated. In most previous cases, schools followed a familiar script: a brief expression of sorrow, a few polite words praising the deceased as “dedicated to teaching”, coupled with the claim that no obvious signs of emotional distress had been detected. Parents, meanwhile, tended to focus less on the dead than on whether their own children had been affected, sometimes even questioning why the teacher had chosen to die on school grounds and frighten students in the process. This case unfolded differently. It was only because fellow teachers from the same school collectively spoke to the media that the incident drew sustained public attention.

The causes of suicide are always complex. Even so, the information already in the public domain points unmistakably towards deeper failures in the governance and management culture of both the school and its sponsoring body.

The first issue exposed was the hollowness of the complaints mechanism itself. Teachers from the school revealed that the sponsoring body had previously received two anonymous complaints against the principal. On both occasions, the response amounted to little more than requesting a written explanation from the principal, after which the matter quietly disappeared. When Ms Lam later submitted a named complaint, the sponsoring body reportedly turned around and sought verification from the principal regarding her situation within the school. That decision appears to have triggered the final tragedy.

The episode reveals a familiar bureaucratic paradox in the handling of complaints. Anonymous complaints can be dismissed in the name of “protecting privacy”, or rejected outright on the grounds that allegations cannot be verified. Named complaints, meanwhile, often result not in confronting the problem but in targeting the complainant, handing both the complaint and the complainant back to the very authority being accused. Such bureaucratic reflexes — cold, self-protective and detached from the realities faced by frontline staff — leave a chilling impression.

As further allegations emerged, the sponsoring body shifted into crisis-management mode. It announced that the principal had taken leave and been admitted to the psychiatric department of Shatin Hospital, while an “independent investigation committee” had also been established. The formula soon followed: “No further comment before the investigation concludes.” The public relations strategy was polished and predictable. Delay the discussion long enough, wait for media attention to fade, allow the controversy to dissipate. Whether there is genuine determination to confront institutional failures remains doubtful.

The deeper question concerns what the school supervisor and board members were doing before the incident occurred — and indeed after Ms Lam’s death. As school governance scholar Lui Kee-cheung recently argued, the heart of the matter lies in “the human problem”. Why did those responsible for appointing the principal select an individual whose character had already become a matter of controversy, and who may even have been struggling with serious mental illness, to occupy such a critical leadership role?

Over the years, did any board member ask departing teachers why they chose to leave? Did anyone attempt to understand why staff turnover remained persistently high? I do not oppose individuals with mental illness serving as school principals. That is not the issue. The question is whether the sponsoring body bears responsibility for explaining such an appointment to teachers, students and parents alike — and for persuading the school community to continue extending compassion and support while a principal earning a monthly salary of HK$100,000 takes prolonged sick leave.

For years, education reform slogans proclaiming “everything for students” have echoed across Hong Kong, while school-based management was celebrated as a symbol of decentralisation and institutional flexibility. Yet this incident exposes another side of school-based management: bureaucratic evasion, concentrated authority and the diffusion of accountability. These consequences have long existed, but attracted remarkably little scrutiny.

As Eldridge Cleaver once wrote: “If you are not part of the solution, then you are part of the problem.” One can only hope that the reflection and reckoning now facing Tung Wah Group of Hospitals will become part of the solution rather than another exercise in institutional self-preservation.

Leung, Y. W. (2019.03.29). A Teacher’s Suicide and the Accountability of School Sponsoring Bodies. The Hong Kong Economic Journal, C04. 

停不了的執着 強迫症式字詞教學 - 《信報財經新聞》

眾所周知，學習動機是孩子自發學習的關鍵，也是語文教學與研究的重要目標。可是，數以億元計的教育研究投資，也未必能平衡2003年以來，教育局所編的《香港小學學習字詞表》對學習動機的打擊。

《香港小學學習字詞表》出現後，各校奉之為天書，一律嚴守，如不跟正字，就是錯。對此，坊間戲稱為「強迫症教學法」或「執字粒」……

據教育局所言，《香港小學學習字詞表》以「循科學方法更新學習詞彙，以適應社會語言發展」為目標，前言提出「語言是約定俗成的結果」、「貼近社會」、「語境中自然地學習」，先把好話說盡，再以最嚴謹的規範把九千多字詞收錄表中。此後，各校一律奉之為天書，一旦學生字體結構不合，如「月」字旁的下畫沒寫成一剔、「告」字上方沒寫成「牛」、「拐」字左下方不能寫作「力」等，一律視為錯字，扣分處理。對此，坊間戲稱為「強迫症教學法」或「執字粒」。

家長成驚弓之鳥

誠然，字詞規範可以減少爭拗，成為應對怪獸家長的重要憑藉，但它所引起的副作用，也是不能忽視的。

對家長而言，這令他們難以輔導課業。一直以來，家長在輔導課業和溫習方面擔當着無可替代的重要角色，也與子女學習成績直接掛鈎。然而《字詞表》的出現，令不少家長深怕教錯孩子而卻步。這不只是一般階層，筆者身邊的專業人士，乃至大學教授級的同事，對着孩子課業也不敢給予肯定答案，精力都花在翻書查Apps之上。

教師耗大量精力

對教師而言，儘管規範字詞能幫助他們應對怪獸家長，但他們必須在課堂上耗用極大量的時間與精力作示範，以免學生寫錯，其後又必須瞄準一點一畫來挑出每字錯處，再強迫學生改正，這令教師難以集中教學設計來啟迪學生的語文之美。畢竟，即使再有趣的活動，再創新的教學法，只要「執字粒」不夠嚴謹，查簿時依舊被貼滿標籤，發回重改。

對學生而言，他們也沒空漫步於詩詞林苑、品位美文的清新雋永。日復一日的交叉和改正，除不斷打擊孩子自信及書寫意願外，也讓他們認識到文字標準比文采橫溢更重要，因每字五分扣下去的話，即使巴金、朱自清再世，也足以被扣至重考。所謂學教喜悅，早成為了以生命折磨生命，從雞蛋挑出連串骨頭的「執字粒」遊戲。

對學生影響深遠

在面向二十一世紀，強調通識、創意與批判思考的知識型經濟下，為何學校還要耗費大量人力物力，罔顧學生學習動機，堅持一點一畫地「執字粒」？這真的沒有意義嗎？也不盡然。

過程中，學生學的不只是語文，更習慣了如何面對強迫症上司的無理要求，以及「規範至上」的重要性，皆因這兩點凌駕於所有「源流」、「約定俗成」或「文化差異」。未來新一代一旦發現現實與自身認知有衝突，便不會從常識尋找答案，而是先看看相關官方規章如何說，並以此為唯一標準。這可參考社會學家福柯（Michel Foucault）所言，學校經常通過種種隱性課程，如課程設計、設施、儀式、校服等讓微權力（micro-power）伸入每個人最精微和潛藏的部分，時刻規訓個體行為，使之成為「溫馴的身體」（docile body），無意識地服從權力，並習以為常。

誠如黑格爾所言：「存在即合理」。也許，《字詞表》極端規範所訓練出來的大眾意識，正是它存在多年，怨聲載道下還被持續推行的原因。

梁亦華(2019.02.08)︰停不了的執着 強迫症式字詞教學，《信報財經新聞》，C04，教育講論。

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English Summary

Mr Frankie Leung on the Hong Kong Chinese Lexical Lists for Primary Learning

--By Mr Frankie Leung Yick-wah, Project Officer at the Faculty of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences

-          In a contributed article to HKEJ, Mr Leung said that the Hong Kong Chinese Lexical Lists for Primary Learning compiled by EDB is the ultimate guidebook for teachers in the teaching of Chinese characters and expressions. However, Mr Leung said the Lists will make it difficult for teachers to motivate students to learn Chinese, enlighten them on the beauty of the Chinese language, and help them be innovative and critical.